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Gangs and the Origins of a Culture of Violence 
in El Salvador 
 
Norma Roumie 
University of Windsor 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Gang violence in El Salvador has resulted in conditions that 
have perpetuated an environment of terror and culture of violence. 
This paper aims to understand the emergence of transnational gangs 
in El Salvador and the US involvement in this process. The article is 
divided into the following subtitles; 1980s civil war and the 
repercussions of US involvement, Salvadorans migration to the US 
and reverse migration (with a focus on Los Angeles and San 
Salvador), and US exportation of heavy-handed policies to El 
Salvador’s institutionalized use of political violence. The paper 
concludes that US involvement in El Salvador created a foundation 
for a culture of violence and through interlinked factors US influence 
and actions instigated circumstances for gang proliferated in El 
Salvador. 
 
 
Keywords: El Salvador, Latin America, Gangs, Migration, Culture of 
Violence, Northern Triangle, US Politics 
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The Central American University’s Institute of Public Opinion 
(IUODOP) conducted two studies in 1998 and 2003, in which 
Salvadoran participants were presented with scenarios and questioned 
on whether the scenarios justified or condoned a violent response. 
The survey results revealed extremely high levels of reception 
towards violence and aggressive attitudes among the Salvadoran 
people.1 Today El Salvador, part of Central America’s Triangle of 
Death, is engulfed in gang warfare and drug trafficking.2 This has 
created massive political instability, prevented economic growth, and 
has resulted in high homicide rates — all of these have in turn 
perpetuated an environment of terror and embedded cultural 
violence.3 El Salvador is currently known as the murder capital of the 
world  - primarily due to gang violence and the multifaceted factors 
contributing to the violence that continues to plague the country 
today, the effects of which have been tragic on the Salvadoran 
society.4  
 
The United States (US) government has maintained interest in El 
Salvador and has been a large supporter of the regime since the 
country’s civil war in the 1980s. Today, the US maintains political and 
security interests in El Salvador, and in an attempt to stabilize the 
region, it is one of the largest aid donors.5 Despite the efforts of the 
US government to bring prosperity to El Salvador, critics have 
                                                        
1 Joaquin Chávez. “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador.” NACLA Report on 
the Americas, vol. 37, no. 6 (2004), 31. 
2 Triangle of Death is a term used to describe the most violent region of the 
world, the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras.  
3 AFP. “El Salvador becomes world's most deadly country outside a war 
zone.” The Telegraph, January 5, 2016. 
4 “The World's Most Dangerous Cities.” The Economist (March 31, 2017). 
5 Clare Ribando Seelke. “El Salvador: Background and US Relations.” Current 
Politics and Economics of South and Central America, vol. 7, no. 4 (2014), 537. 
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theorized that US involvement in the country created the gang 
problem in the first place and contributed to the regime’s aggressive 
policies. This paper will begin with an overview of gangs in El 
Salvador and an overview of the current historiography on El 
Salvador’s history. In order to understand the situation and US 
involvement in this process, the analysis will be divided into the 
following subtitles: 1980s civil war and the repercussions of US 
involvement, El Salvadoran’s migration to the US and reverse 
migration (with a focus on Los Angeles and San Salvador), and US 
exportation of heavy-handed policies to El Salvador’s 
institutionalized use of political violence. 
Overview 
 
In Central America, gangs are referred to as “mara” and “pandilla,” 
both slang words that are used interchangeably for “youth gang.” 
While some studies use the words interchangeably, others 
differentiate between the two by defining pandillas as localized groups 
that have formally existed in the region and maras as a more 
contemporary occurrence that have transnational roots. 6  However, 
the term is strongly associated with the Mara Salvatrucha and 
Dieciocho gangs, which are commonly referred to as adult “street 
gangs” that had evolved from these “youth gangs.” Within El 
Salvador, the most prominent gangs are the Mara Salvatrucha, also 
known as MS-13, and Mara 18/Barro18/M-18, also known as 
Eighteenth Street Gang. Today these are locally known as maras, 
developed from youth street gangs to transnational groups. 7 
According to collected sources, both gangs compromise more than 
87% of the gang membership in El Salvador and have a large 
presence in many neighbourhoods.8  
 
                                                        
6 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 74. 
7 José Miguel Cruz, “Central American Maras: from youth street gangs to 
transnational protection rackets,” Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 4 (2010), 380 
8 José Miguel Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of 
Violence,” In Global Gangs Workshop, Centre on Conflict, Development, and 
Peacebuilding, Geneva. (2009), 1.  
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These gangs are not a new phenomenon in El Salvador; the origins of 
Salvadoran youth gangs can be traced back to the 1950s, among 
privileged teenage schoolboys who would partake in rivalries and 
erratic street fights.9 Additionally, as a result of the urbanization and 
industrialization that El Salvador began experiencing in the 1950s, 
evidence suggests that gangs grew in urban centers in the 1960s, 
especially with the weakening of public institutions, increased 
political turbulence, and the growing elite of coffee plantation owners 
that neglected the agrarian poor. 10 According to De Castro, gangs 
did not have political aims, and they exhibited little interest in altering 
the state structure, which is in contrast to the young guerrillas of the 
1960s-1980s who aspired for political power. Instead, the gangs’ 
objectives were short-term in the form of winning esteem and respect 
through committing violence against persons and private property, 
consuming soft drugs, and defending their ‘turf’ from other gangs. 
Despite the criminal nature of their actions, some of these groups 
had close relationships with their communities and acted as 
neighborhood overseers. 11  Today the gangs have developed from 
being turf-based small gangs who hung out in slums and city squares, 
to an association of cliques or networks who identify under the same 
franchise of either MS-13 or 18th Street, controlling many areas in El 
Salvador and organizing larger criminal activities. Nevertheless, 
whether young people in El Salvador are involved with gangs or not, 
they tend to face high levels of violence. According to the El 
Salvadoran Forensic Institute, 41% of murders in 2006 were 
perpetrated against young people aged 10 to 24 years old.12 This has 
largely become a cultural issue and violence has permeated many 
aspects of life.  
 
                                                        
9 Manuel Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally: Pentecostalism and gangs in 
El Salvador and the United States,” Christianity, Social Change, and 
Globalization in the America’s (2003), 7. 
10 Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence," 2.  
11 Rafael Fernández De Castro, "Demystifying the maras." Americas Quarterly, 
vol. 1, no. 2 (2007), 70-71.  
12 Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 7-
13. 
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There is no unanimous consensus amongst experts on the exact 
causes and logic of gang proliferation. The academic debate is split 
regarding whether gangs in Central America are locally rooted or if 
they have proliferated due to migration and transnational crime. 
Some scholars, like Anika Oettler and Nazih Richani argue that gangs 
in Central America have taken over the role of the state and that they 
provide order to weak institutional societies. 13   This is especially 
prevalent in poor neighbourhoods in which gangs can attract 
members easily due to their cohesiveness, strong collective identity, 
and offering the chance for economic improvement, albeit through 
illegal means. In this sense, there is a focus on the root causes of gang 
proliferation, such as unemployment, incarceration, relocation, and 
communal fragmentation.14 Scholars have also concentrated on the 
evolution of gangs over time. Some scholars stress the role of local 
conditions that lead to “gang institutionalization,” while other 
scholars focus on the contribution of communication technologies 
and the role of globalization. 15  A prominent scholar on gangs in 
Central America, Miguel Cruz, focuses on “gang institutionalization” 
by highlighting the contact that occurs between local conditions and 
transnational progressions (migration, diffused cultural practices). 
Cruz asserts that marginalisation and law enforcement policies are 
important in understanding the emergence of street gangs in the 
United States and Central America, especially in explaining the 
transnational networks and influential local protection rackets. 
However, in his argument, the circular migration of Salvadorans to 
the US is not sufficient enough to explain the growing 
transnationalism of gangs, as other Latin American states had mass 
migration but have different results than El Salvador. This means that 
El Salvador is a unique case due to the divergent results and the 
current severity of its gang situation. Hence, Cruz focuses on a 
                                                        
13 Nazih Richani, “State capacity in postconflict settings: Explaining criminal 
violence in El Salvador and Guatemala.” Civil Wars, vol. 12, no. 4 (2010), 431-
455. 
14 Anika Oettler, “The Central American fear of youth.” International Journal of 
Conflict and Violence, vol 5, no. 2 (2011), 263. 
15 Cruz, “Central American maras: from youth street gangs to transnational 
protection rackets,” 380-388.  
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spectrum of factors: marginalization, migration, cross-culturalization, 
and the politics of violence. 16  
 
Although many studies mention the migration of Salvadorans as one 
of the interrelated and possible causes of gang proliferation, little 
thought is given to US policies that uprooted this gang proliferation. 
Additionally, little focus is paid to the history of US involvement in 
El Salvador dating back to the 1980-1992 civil war or current foreign 
policies that have played a role in the creation of a culture of 
violence. Hence, this paper will link much of the research that has 
been done on gangs by connecting the US role in the proliferation 
and perseverance of gangs in El Salvador. In order to gather a strong 
understanding of how the following research relates to each other, a 
definition of transnationalism, multiple marginality, and legal violence 
is needed. Ian Tyrell defines transnationalism as “the movement of 
peoples, ideas, technologies, and institutions across national 
boundaries’. 17  It is important to differentiate between 
transnationalism from above and transnationalism from below, the 
relationship between nations and beyond nations. According to 
James Diego Vigil, multiple marginality “outlines several important 
components in the relationship between race/ethnicity and gang 
membership, including macrohistorical and macrostructural forces, 
ecological and economic stressors, elements of social control, and 
street socialization.” 18  Furthermore, legal violence is a sort of 
structural violence that is embedded and sanctioned within laws, that 
intend to protect rights or regulate behavior for the general good, yet 
concurrently increases practices that hurt certain social groups.19 
 
                                                        
16 Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 1-9.  
17 Ian Tyrell, “Ian Tyrell Responds.” The American Historical Review, vol. 96, 
no. 4 (1991), 1068, 69, 70, 71, 72.  
18 Adrienne Freng and Esbensen Finn Aage, “Race and gang affiliation: An 
examination of multiple marginality,” Justice Quarterly, vol.  24, no. 4 (2007), 
604, 605.  
19 Cecilia Menjívar and Leisy Abrego, “Legal Violence: Immigration Law and 
the Lives of Central American Immigrants1,” American Journal of Sociology, 
vol. 117, no. 5 (2012), 1387.  
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Civil War 
 
It is important to understand the historical and cultural violence in El 
Salvador. The civil war acted as a watershed moment in El Salvador’s 
history and helped establish a culture of violence as a viable solution 
for social and political conflicts. Economic disparities sparked a civil 
war that lasted from 1979 until 1992. The US played an active role in 
supporting the Salvadoran government during the civil war in its fight 
against pro-communist insurgents, which were viewed by the US 
government as part of a larger communist network. The US provided 
an enormous amount of financial support (sending $1.5 million per 
day) and armed and trained government Armed Forces. For example, 
the US established the Army School of the Americas, where 
Salvadoran military officials were trained in anti-communist counter-
insurgency efforts. 20  US support developed into an amplified 
repression against communist guerrillas, its sympathizers and 
thousands of innocent civilians. The US continued to fund the 
regime with military resources despite evidence that military aid was 
bypassing the government and ended up in the hands of corrupt 
members of the armed forces and paramilitary groups who had 
committed terror tactics, such as death squad operations, to pillage 
the countryside and massacre whole villages.21  This 12-year conflict 
resulted in 70,000 deaths, 500,000 refugees and tens of thousands of 
citizens disappeared and wounded.22 In the post-war era, the U.S. 
endorsed a neoliberal economic reconstruction plan in El Salvador, 
which resulted in increased foreign investment, privatization of 
public infrastructure and lack of investment in public programs.23  
 
                                                        
20 Mary Kathleen Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa? Deportation and the 
Making of Home in the US-El Salvador Transnatio” PhD. Dissertation. (2014): 
103. 
21 Stephen Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution: Displaced Salvadorans and US 
Refugee Policy in the 1980s.” Journal of Policy History, vol. 23, no. 3 (2011), 
300-363. 
22 Chávez, “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador,” 33.  
23 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?”, 49. 
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Issues that led to the war were largely ignored, while wounds and 
frustration would remain further exacerbated by the neoliberal 
policies that would push many into poverty. Neoliberal policies failed 
to work; they ignored the fundamental aspects of peace building by 
pushing aside national reconciliation and creating little opportunity 
for poverty alleviation. The war destroyed the social makeup, while 
also implementing characteristics of violence in everyday life, the use 
of terror and aggression to deal with social conflict and the lack of 
value for human wellbeing. In this context, youth gangs reproduced 
their social frustrations through violence that was internalized during 
the war. 24  According to Miguel Cruz, many Salvadorans faced 
socioeconomic discrimination that induced further forms of 
marginalization.25  
 
Another fundamental factor in the increased use of violence is the 
proliferation of firearms and explosives in civilian hands that were 
left behind by the war. According to Joaquin Chavez, this is an 
emergence of a “culture of arms” in which dominant cultural 
attitudes favour the ownership and the usage of firearms. Incidences 
of violent crimes involving firearms are very high due to the 
increased use of both registered and illegal weapons; the number of 
deaths related to gun use today is greater than in the post-war period. 
26 This is part of the accessibility thesis that argues that the extensive 
accessibility of arms and light weapons point to an amplified use of 
violence.27  
 
For Chavez, then, the US is in large part to blame for this, as many 
American weapons entered the market during the civil war and today 
continue to be used in criminal activities.28  According to a Periodic 
Brief prepared for the Small Arms Survey in El Salvador, the large 
                                                        
24 Vasquez,” “Saving souls transnationally” 4.  
25 Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 7-8. 
26 Chávez, “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador,” 37-38. 
27 Jayantha Dhanapala, “Multilateral cooperation on small arms and light 
weapons: From crisis to collective response,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 
vol. 9 (2002), 164-165. 
28 Chávez, “An anatomy of violence in El Salvador,” 37. 
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transfers of small arms and light weapons that the US government 
made to the Salvadoran military during the civil war are now 
commonly used and reported in criminal activities.29 According to the 
study, the older supply of weapons presents enough substantial harm 
even without taking into consideration the entry of post-civil war 
legal and illegal weaponry. 30  With increasing instances of armed 
violence and a post-war state marked by a corrupt police force and an 
unreliable judicial system, many people buy weapons for the purpose 
of protection. The war left a divided and traumatized society with 
many internally displaced, increasing disintegration of major cities, 
and an environment that allowed gangs to thrive in the face of 
economic marginalization, social exclusion, and violence.31 Therefore, 
it is not surprising that gangs increased after the civil war, the 
conditions and aftermath of which would set in stone a culture of 
violence; a traumatized society, an increased level of poverty and use 
of violence in all areas of life, as well as ready access to weapons.  
Migration: 
Reception 
On the onset of the civil war, following massive migration and 
displacement, many El Salvadorans would attempt to a seek refugee 
in the United States. At this time, the 1980 Refugee Act removed 
nationality as a criterion for refugee status and replaced it with a case-
by-case basis in which refugees would be judged individually instead 
of as a group.32 Refugee policy was extremely politicized because it 
became easier to ignore large groups fleeing war or persecution, and 
because the US supported the right-wing government of El Salvador, 
it systematically rejected refugee standing, refugee exemption, and 
political asylum to Salvadorans escaping the war. This dictated the 
refugee policy towards Salvadorans at the time, and refugee status 
                                                        
29 William Godnick, Erick Haven, and Ivonne Martinez-Henriquez. “SAND 
(Program on Security and Development) Brief: El Salvador.” Periodic Brief 
prepared for the Small Arms Survey (March 2000), 1-3. 
30 Godnick, Haven, and Martinez-Henriquez. “SAND,” 3.  
31 Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 6. 
32 Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution,” 359.  
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was rejected with the vague and biased interpretation of “fear of 
persecution” clause. Thousands of displaced Salvadorans were 
increasingly detained and deported at the border and despite their 
well-founded fears, labeled as economic refugees. 33  Between 1983 
and 1990, the US approved asylum for only 2.6% of the applications 
submitted by Salvadorans.34 The legal consequences of the Refugee 
Act put forward an exclusionary refugee policy; the Cold War 
mentality was clearly evident in granting and favoring refugee status 
to citizens fleeing communist regimes. More than 90% of the 3 
million refugees granted admittance into the US between the years 
1946 and 1994 had fled communist regimes (for example, from 
Poland, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Romania and etc). 35  Within this 
environment, it is evident at that time that the US functioned in a 
political climate that was unfriendly and unreceptive to Salvadorans, 
as there existed strong anti-immigration and anti-refugee rhetoric as a 
whole. 36  Within the media and politics there existed a strong 
perception of Salvadoran refugees as self-interested economic 
migrants, and prevalent xenophobia rhetoric questioned their cultural 
integration. 37 As Salvadorans were in search of a haven, many were 
rendered to a precarious legal position throughout the entire decade 
and would face many issues forging their new lives in the United 
States.  
Life and uncertainty  
For Salvadorans, life in the US was marked by symbolic and 
structural violence that produced social suffering and long-term 
repercussions for incorporation into society. These struggles resulted 
from the fear of deportation; the exploitation of their work and 
rights; as well as their exclusion from socioeconomic resources that 
were vital for their mobility and incorporation into society. 
Immigrants are accountable to the law but are also excluded from 
                                                        
33 Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution,” 357- 76.  
34 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 107-08.  
35 John Povwell, Encyclopedia of North American Immigration, New York, NY: 
Facts on File, Inc., (2005), 64. 
36 Povwell, Encyclopedia of North American Immigration, 109. 
37 Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution,” 364-67.  
Roumie 34 
 
legal protection that virtually forces them to reside in a nation, but 
not be seen as part of it. From the initial migration of Salvadorans 
into the US in the early 1980s, they have been in a limbo of legal 
uncertainty with temporary applications, reapplications, long 
processes, and a threat of looming deportation. 38 Unfortunately, they 
also lacked a direct path to citizenship due to strict requirements and 
complex procedures that both excluded and discouraged many from 
becoming citizens. The repercussions of this in the long-term are 
shown on statistics on Salvadorans living in the US in 2011, in which 
only 29% were citizens, 46% were undocumented, another 25% held 
temporary status or green cards, and a significant 71% were eligible 
for removal if detained by immigration officials for either a lack of 
documentation or committed offense.39  
 
The Salvadoran migrant community was left in a legally vulnerable 
and highly deportable state. Part of this is since many were ineligible 
for legal protection and social services because of their status, and 
undocumented Salvadorans were forced into vulnerable and limited 
spaces with little upward mobility that made them easily exploitable 
sources of labor. The majority that resided in the US after the civil 
war were rural and uneducated, which has further put them in low-
income jobs with a narrow prospect for upward mobility. 40  The 
Salvadoran populations in general are more likely to live in poverty 
than both native-born population and foreign-born populations.41 A 
study conducted in 1995 showed that many worked in low-paying 
jobs, little security and mobility as well as a feeling of alienated from 
mainstream society.42 Many Salvadoran immigrants lived in fear of 
being deported, while media and public discourse portrayed them as 
undeserving lawbreakers, which further alienated their contributions 
in society and created a situation ripe for their mistreatment. 43 In 
                                                        
38 Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1384-1392. 
39 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 111. 
40 Sarah Gammage, “El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration 
Continues,” Migration Policy Institute (July 26, 2007), 1-3.  
41 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 111-12. 
42 Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally,” 5-6. 
43 Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1411.  
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1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) came into effect. Both of these acts permitted and made 
easier the deportation of documented immigrants by expanding the 
term-aggravated felony to incorporate offenses that were previously 
seen as relatively minor crimes, as well as mandating the ground for 
removal if convicted of a prison sentence of one year or more. 44 For 
example, in 1998 Salvadorans accounted for approximately 21% of 
immigrants who were deported, and today they compromise the 
fourth largest group of deportees. 45 Laws such as these normalized 
the perception of Salvadorans as criminals, which impeded 
integration and hindered mobility in several ways.  
The Creation of Gangs in Los Angeles 
The largest population of Salvadorans in the US reside in California, 
particularly in Los Angeles (LA). Within LA, ethnic and racial 
tensions, as well as a negative reception, along with the psychological 
impact of war, fostered the reaction and formation of a Salvadoran 
street gang. South Central Los Angeles was an area previously 
dominated by African Americans, and with the mass migration of 
Latinos (especially Mexicans), identity politics would emerge between 
both groups as they viewed each other as threats and competed for 
status and space in society. It is within this context that Salvadorans 
arrived in Los Angeles, and due to their already existing state of 
vulnerability, many youths would be enticed into street gangs to give 
themselves purpose and identity.46 In LA, Maras originated from the 
18th Street (M-18) or Dieciocho gang in Los Angeles (Chicano), 
which was founded by Mexican immigrants early in the 1960s and 
grew with the membership of many Salvadoran and Central 
American refugees.47 Salvadorans felt the need to carve out their own 
space and self-defense groups in the streets in relation to Chicano 
gangs.  Later in the 1980s, Salvadoran refugees would form their rival 
group, which would be identified as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). 
                                                        
44 Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1391. 
45 Menjívar and Abrego, “Legal Violence,” 1391. 
46 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 114.  
47 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 110-114.  
Roumie 36 
 
The Dieciocho and the Salvatrucha developed into hostile rivals and 
often clashed with each other and with law enforcement in the city 
blocks of Los Angeles.48 It is within these gangs that Salvadorans 
would incorporate new norms, values, and attitudes in exchange for 
defense, relationships, and support. Salvadoran youth would borrow 
from the dominant Chicano culture and create their own faction; they 
adopted the lifestyle, language, and the dress of cholos (gang 
members). A hybrid culture emerged, and it is evident through the 
Mara language, which is a combination of Salvadoran Spanish, 
Chicano Spanish, and African-American English.49  
 
When MS-13 and M-18 were first formed, they participated primarily 
in drug deals, trafficking, and turf-based fighting. The Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) met these problems with a repressive 
force by prohibiting suspected gangs from meeting in certain areas, 
and raiding suspected gang hangouts and homes. During this period, 
the LAPD-Rampart Division’s anti-gang unit Community Resources 
Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) operated in mostly Salvadoran 
areas of Los Angeles. 50  Despite their primary focus on gangs in 
general, they were especially fixated on targeting, criminalizing, and 
deporting Latino immigrants and young adults that they linked with 
urban decay. 51  This trend of targeting and criminalization would 
continue with the creation in 2005 of ICE’s Operation Community 
Shield, which is a partnership between the government and law 
enforcement that identify and target street gangs for deportation.52 
Since then, more than 31,200 gang members and associates have 
been arrested and deported through the program.53 A major concern 
is the fact that there is no legal definition of what constitutes a gang 
membership; therefore, law enforcement officials have complete 
                                                        
48 Dennis Rodgers and Adam Baird, “Understanding gangs in contemporary 
Latin America,” Forthcoming in Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz (eds.), 
Handbook of Gangs and Gang Responses, New York: Wiley (2015), 14.  
49 Vasquez, “Saving souls transnationally,” 8. 
50 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 114-115. 
51 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 115.  
52 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 100-116.  
53 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 100-116. 
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discretion and judgment which leads to many innocent individuals 
caught up in gang raids also being convicted and deported. 54 The 
media has played a strong role in the sensationalization of the gang 
phenomenon, and it has also contributed to stereotypes and the 
perception that Salvadoran migrants are criminals who will inflict 
disorder in the U.S.55  The consequence of all of this is increased 
deportation and marginalization of the larger Salvadoran community.  
Reverse Migration: 
Context of Return 
Once the civil war ended in El Salvador 1991, thousands of 
Salvadorans made their way back home, both voluntarily and 
forcefully through deportation. The bulk of deportations would take 
place after the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act. In the first year alone, 1,200 
Salvadorans with criminal backgrounds would be deported, more 
than half of which had ties to gangs. 56  Removals have increased 
since the mid-2000s, with a significant percentage holding a criminal 
record, but not necessarily gang related. For example, out of the 
18,677 Salvadorans deported in 2012, 46.2% had a criminal record.57 
During this period, the US government did not provide a complete 
criminal history on deportees to the Salvadoran government; hence in 
many cases, Salvadorans with criminal records were invisible to local 
authorities. 58 However, the Sombra Negra (Black Shadow), a guarded 
group made up of officers and military personnel who during the war 
were known for their death squad tactics, would hunt down and 
murder suspected gang members at times directly on airport arrival.59 
 
Most of the returnees were young males who grew up in a different 
culture, had left El Salvador as children during the war and hence had 
                                                        
54 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 100-116. 
55 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 115-116. 
56 Cruz, “Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence,” 2.  
57 Seelke, “El Salvador: Background and US Relations,” 563.  
58 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 89. 
59 Dingeman-Cerda, “¿ Bienvenidos a Casa?,” 121.  
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no connection to their birth land. In some cases, they did not even 
speak Spanish and their families remained in the US; therefore, they 
had weak social ties. 60  The type of services available to deportees 
from either the US or Salvadoran government were few; hence they 
encountered a weak institutional framework for reinsertion into 
society. There was once a program called Bienvenidos a Casa, or 
Welcome Home, which provided limited help, but its main function 
was to record incoming deportees for potential surveillance. 61 
Reintegration proved difficult, returnees often  become financial 
burdens on their families and were seen as alien in their homeland. 
Additionally, within Salvadoran society, there is a prevalent conflation 
of deportee and gangster identities, which has led to the classification 
of entire groups of deportees as possible threats to national security.62 
Salvadorans returned to a country that is still dealing with the 
structural problems that lead to the civil war (inequality, poverty, 
marginalization, etc.). Consequently, many struggled with a weak 
support system, a lack of economic opportunities, and increased 
levels of violence and criminalization, all of which would further 
marginalize them in society.63  
 
Within the group of deportees that had spent the majority of their 
lives in the US, some see deportation as “betrayal, exile, and 
banishment from the homes they constructed in the U.S.” 64  This 
group is further marginalized because they are also automatically 
treated as if they are gang members even when they do not have a 
history of gang membership.65 Whether they had a gang history or 
not, many of the returning Salvadorans faced stigmatization, violence, 
and a hostile context of return. 66   Therefore, having arrived in a 
country they barely knew, deportees started to create the networks 
and behavioural patterns that offered them security and support in 
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the US (focus on LA), and this is where the formation of chapters of 
the Dieciocho and Salvatrucha gangs takes place.  
 
Cultural diffusion and Gangs  
When deportees with gang histories and criminal records from 
California took to the streets, they encountered gangsters who 
venerated their style and mannerisms, as well as respected their 
experience with real gang culture in the United States. This would 
present many with an opportunity to influence and direct gangs in El 
Salvador. 67 Existing gangs in El Salvador started to adopt the ways of 
returning gang members, and a process known as social remittance, 
which is the movement of symbolism, identities, and norms that 
accompanied the migration of deportees. 68 This started the process 
and expansion of maras that would occur through social imitation 
based on migration and networking. In this way, deportees’ influence 
would change and assimilate the gang culture dramatically. They 
diffused cultural styles in the form of “the use of tattoos, the 
utilization of gang signs to communicate and, more importantly for 
the increase of violence and criminal behavior, they included the 
norms, values, and knowledge about how to behave, about who is the 
enemy, and about who is friend.” 69  Prior to this, youth gangs 
compromised numerous small territorial groups; however, with 
increased migration of California deportees, small groups would 
become two large groups of cliques, the MS-13 and the M-18. A 
study piloted in San Salvador in 1996 revealed that 84% of gangs 
were linked to either MS-13 or M-18. Although American deportees 
made up 10% of gang membership, the cross-culturalization would 
occur largely through contact, imitation, and adaption of identities, 
which is what would transform these gangs into transnational forces 
between the US and Central America. 70 This was not an organized 
effort, the old turf gangs transformed into cliques that would 
compromise an association of gangs recognized as either MS-13 or 
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M-18. These so-called cliques each controlled a specific 
neighbourhood with relative independence from each other; 
however, that would change with gang warfare.71  
 
Violence and battles among gangs, specifically MS-13 and M-18, 
would re-construct the struggle for urban spaces and territory. Gangs 
would use tattoos to mark their bodies and identity, showing 
allegiance to their gang. With the dominant two gangs, there was also 
an increase in the likelihood of interaction among the warring gangs 
proliferated beyond territorial areas. This created a changing dynamic 
of violence because it could now take place anywhere, no longer 
defined by specific boundaries, as they went even beyond a gang’s 
turf. In this sense, a gang’s turf became diffused, and it would cover 
the entire space in which gangs moved, which would cause the 
conflict and insecurity to citizens to become more pervasive. 
Identities associated with either gang would be more important than 
controlling a specific neighbourhood or turf, and this would reshape 
gang warfare. According to Cruz, gangs would no longer build their 
identity based on ethnic origin like they did in California, or build 
their identity in relation to a specific turf like they did in the earlier 
days in El Salvador (Central America); instead they would construct 
their identity based on the opposition and contention with the rival 
gang. 72 In this sense, identity became more important than space, 
and violence would function to reinforce these identities. This would 
have brutal effects because it is no longer entrenched in a native 
context of pandilla culture; therefore, it is less rule-bound and 
constrained. 
 
US Zero tolerance policing: 
Mano Dura (the “iron-fist” plan) 
As a result of the growing presence of MS-13 and M-18, the El 
Salvadoran government implemented anti-gang policing strategies 
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known as Mano Dura (2003) and Super Mano Dura (2004). Both of 
these plans centered on raids and targeting and imprisoning of gang 
members for showing gang-related tattoos or gang signs.73 Any signs 
of gang allegiance and criminal activities would be punished with 
prison sentences up to five to twelve years. In this effort, increased 
spending on policing and a creation of a joint anti-gang military 
police patrols were endorsed. 74  These efforts would largely 
criminalize youth street groups as well as limit the civil rights of gang 
members; the intended goals were a large-scale persecution and 
suppression of gangs. According to the Salvadoran police from July 
2003 to 2005, the police arrested 30,934 youths alleged to be gang 
members. 75 According to Cruz, it is essential to pay attention to the 
“politics of violence” which has institutionalized gangs through a 
combination of efforts of institutions, players, and plans that 
advanced the severe use of violence as a standard feature of 
Salvadoran youth gangs.76 The consequences of such strict policies 
would be the primary tool to dealing with marginalized youth and 
would further institutionalize gangs.  
 
The mass incarceration of gang members overpopulated the already 
weak prison system, but it also provided the opportunity for gang 
organization and cohesion. This was made possible by the decision of 
the state, built on the American model, to separate gangs in prison 
centers based on their gang affiliation.77 This would allow gangs to 
network inside jails with cliques from all over the country leading to 
an ultimately better organized and well-connected network of gangs. 
The Jails themselves would become an assembly in which gangs 
would debate, make deals, and resolve strategies and plans. Mano 
dura law only worsened gang violence. It entrenched the state’s use 
of violence against the youth and offered the maras with the opening 
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to consolidate, unite, and acquire regional and national leaderships. 78  
Also, the all-war against gangs brought in new violent actors (drugs 
and traffickers), more resources (guns and weapons for defense), and 
an entrenched pattern of Salvadoran violence. These hardline policies 
would mark a turning point for the institutionalization of gangs, and 
the use of violent policies to suppress them would lead to further 
violence and transcend boundaries of both the state and the 
community. 
 
When looking at what drives violence and crime, inequality and social 
exclusion play a major role in creating a breeding ground for gang 
membership. Consequently, the hardline policies that are being used 
to combat gangs are further adding on to the diminishing social 
relations. On the contrary, Nicaragua, a country in Central America 
that is the poorest (GDP) yet the safest is using a different approach 
to deal with gangs. It has been fortunate and spared much of the 
gang violence that nearby countries face and its approach to violence 
is key to this.  Instead of pooling money and resources into a police 
budget, Nicaragua uses their resources for community development 
and has enforced a softer approach on gangs to prevent further 
marginalization and crime. A community-based approach is used in 
regards to gangs; in which police sponsor meetings with social 
workers, community members and family meetings with competing 
gangs and groups. This approach is used as a tactic of inclusion 
instead of isolating and repressing local gangs, both current and 
potential gangs are given the opportunity to resolve differences and 
are provided the resources and assistance to change their course of 
life away from that of criminal activities and gangs. For example, 
when Daniel Ortega resumed presidency in 2007, he put forward and 
adopted community-based policing programs - which are a stark 
difference to the mano dura policies used in El Salvador. 79  It is 
important to note the significant influence the US plays in this 
creation of a penal state - an extension of US efforts at dealing with 
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crime both abroad and at home (further elaborated on in the next 
section). 
US export of zero-tolerance policies 
“We’re mounting a coordinated, aggressive suppression strategy that 
targets the worst offenders and the most violent gangs. We’re 
converging local, state, federal and even international efforts … 
coming at them with everything we have.” – Los Angeles Mayor 
Antonio Villaraigosa,80 
According to Markus-Michael Müller, the import of anti-gang zero 
tolerance-oriented penal policing is to a large degree prompted by 
police building efforts sponsored by US organizations as well as 
through interrelated activities of American embassies. 81  Other 
methods included police training by the FBI and Drug Enforcement 
Agency, as well as connections of Central American law enforcement 
agents to US law enforcement divisions that actively pursued zero-
tolerance methods of policing (Los Angeles). US police building 
assistance has converged with local political interests of holding 
crime accountable. This would connect international punitive anti-
gang efforts across the Americas, which would result in crackdowns 
in marginalized neighbourhoods and lead to the unprecedented 
imprisonment of marginalized youth in El Salvador. 82 Since the early 
2000s, there is a growing perception of MS-13 and M-18 as 
transnational gangs, which has brought Central American and 
American officials under the guise of viewing these gangs as both 
national and regional security threats connected to cross-border 
criminal activities and drug trafficking. The United States would have 
an interest in maintaining its national security against gangs, drugs, 
and even terrorist links.83 In the last decade, the US has increased 
collaborative efforts with El Salvador, communicative links on report 
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and intelligence records, funding the International Law Enforcement 
Academy in El Salvador, blocking assets of gang members, and 
attempting to create a transnational security apparatus.84  
 
In addition, these efforts abroad are entwined with efforts at home as 
they fortify punitive gang suppression exertions within the US. 
American efforts in gaining as much information and data on gang 
members abroad have produced a systematic criminalization of 
marginalized Latino and Salvadoran groups in the US.85 Not only is 
the US pursuing a war on transnational gangs abroad; it has translated 
into a war on gangs at home. As mentioned in the section on the 
context of migration, migrant Latin American communities in Los 
Angeles are faced with increased racialized and politicized policing 
and surveillance in their neighbourhoods. Policy concerns about 
transnational gangs have translated into increased pressures to 
persecute gang members at home. 86 Not only has the US exported its 
version of heavy-handed policies in dealing with gangs and other 
criminals in an effort to coordinate a security apparatus, but such 
efforts also have an effect on communities abroad and at home, 
which creates a cycle of violence and marginalization.  
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this paper has examined the multilayered and 
interlinked factors of the US influence and actions that instigated the 
circumstances in which gangs proliferated in El Salvador. 
Furthermore, it is evident that through these actions, the US has also 
created a foundation for a culture of violence. Starting at the 
watershed moment of the Salvadoran civil war, US efforts would 
prove to be vital to the government crackdown on guerillas. 
Although the US backed government won the war against 
communism, it started a new war against poverty, marginalization, 
the use of violence and the culture of arms. The civil war would set in 
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stone the culture of violence - use of violence to solve political and 
social issues. In addition, the mass migration and reception of 
Salvadorans in the US can be described as a negative social reception 
that forced structural violence (legal violence) that would place 
migrants at the marginal of society leading many to seek other outlets 
to fulfill the void created by a lack of belonging. The growth of MS-
13 and M-18 in Los Angeles is largely due to marginalization, ethnic 
conflict and marking space in society. Law enforcement’s harsh 
response and use of legal violence in the form of criminalization and 
deportation would set the stage for transnationalism. The massive 
influx of deportees with criminal records back to El Salvador, to a 
society still dealing with the effects of the civil war and a government 
lacking the institution to govern properly would lead to the 
reconfiguration of the existing gang culture. The diffusion of the Los 
Angeles gang cultural style into Salvadoran gangs and the ultimate 
dominance of both MS-13 and M-18 would be transformative for 
gangs in El Salvador. The rise and dominance of both gangs would 
transform space, guerilla warfare, and criminal activities. The staunch 
government response of Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura would 
benefit the institutionalization of gangs while marginalizing youth and 
further creating instability and conflict within society. It is evident 
that such anti-gang zero tolerance punitive policies are imported 
through contact, support, cooperative efforts and links with US 
agencies, governments, and law enforcement. The transnational 
context of gangs and their ability to transcend borders, as is evident 
in this case, and US efforts to combat gangs both abroad and at 
home, have resulted in repercussions on Salvadoran communities and 
set a cycle of political violence and marginalization.  
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